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INTERPRETING THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEAL TH ACT OF 1970
Some Early Principles and Commentaries

Robert D. Moran*

Commissioner Moran expounds upon several early interpreta·
tions of the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 concerning the definition of what constitutes a
"recognized hazard" under the General Duty Clause of the
Act, the responsibility of employers for the unsafe acts of their
employees, the establishment of what constitutes a "reasonable
time" between an inspection and the issuance of a citation, the
appropriateness of penalties, and the extent to which stipulations should be accepted by the Commission. He suggests that,
while the Act is undergoing growing pains, several of its more
important sections have been sufficiently litigated so as to
provide guidelines for those subject to its coverage.
INTRODUCTION
Although employers will soon be entering their third year under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,1 many of those
employers subject to its coverage are still unaware of its requirements.
This article will seek to review briefly the history and substance of this
law, and will investigate some of the principles which have emerged
from cases adjudicated thereunder, such as what constitutes a
"recognized hazard," and what comprise the new responsibilities of
employers.
Like the National Labor Relations Ace and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 3 its statutory kindred spirits of three decades ago, this \
new law was conceived amid legislative controversy even though there
was general agreement on the need to alleviate the social and economic
ills it was designed to cure. 4 The Occupational Safety and Health Act
* Mr. Moran, a member of the Massachusetts Bar, is Chairman of the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
4. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 1,49 Stat. 449, the famous "Wagner
Act," providing the first federal recognition of the right to organize and bargain
collectively, protected the workers' discharge for such activities. The Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, ch. 676_, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060, protected the workers' pocketbooks by providing for
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of 19705 is essentially a compromise among the often diverse desires of
organized labor, management, forces pushing for environmental
improvements and government leaders whose purposes often diverge
from those of nongovernment supporters. In its final legislative stages,
two different bills emerged from the two Houses of Congress which
were similar, yet differed in many important provisions. Senator
Harrison Williams of New Jersey was closely identified with one of the
bills, 6 while the other was guided through the House under the
leadership of Representative William A. Steiger of Wisconsin. 7 The Act
has since become appropriately known as the Williams-Steiger
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 8
The Act vested in the Secretary of Labor the obligation to enforce
compliance with its requirements. 9 To discharge this responsibility, the
Act provided him with an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, I 0 who heads a section within the Department
already well known by its acronym, OSHA (The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration). He, in turn, is assisted by "compliance
officers," who conduct inspections· of workplaces, both in response to
complaints and on their own initiative. At the end of 1972, OSHA had
about 500 of these compliance officers at work throughout the
country.
The Act further authorizes "the· Secretary of Labor to set mandatory
occupational safety and health standards applicable to businesses
affecting interstate commerce ... ," and creates "an Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission for carrying out adjudicatory
functions under the Act."1 I

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

a minimum hourly wage rate, mandatory overtime pay, and the prohibition of wage
differentials by sex and age. With the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 651 (1970); the federal government has moved decisively to protect the workers'
lives and limbs.
Congress has long recognized the need for minimum safety and health standards.
However, the legislators either thought their scope of authority did not extend to the
promulgation of such standards or feared the reactions of the businessmen who would be
forced to spend to improve the working conditions for their employees. Thus, while the
Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, ch. 881, § 1, 49 Stat. 2036, prohibited the federal purchase of
items manufactured under "unsanitary or hazardous" working conditions, it did not forbid
the conditions themselves. It was not until 1960 that safety and health standards were
promulgated under it.
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
The Williams' bill, S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which had the solid support of
organized labor, placed total responsibility in the field of occupational safety and health
with the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary would have set standards, conducted the
complicance inspections, and adjudicated all violations under this version.
H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This was the administration's bill which featured
promulgation of safety and health standards by an independent board, compliance
inspections by the Secretary, and adjudication by an independent commission.
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
Occupational Safety and Health Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970) '[hereinafter cited as
OSHA].
[d. § 29(a)(2).
[d. § 2(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3).
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It should be noted that the Review Commission is an independent
agency created by § 12 of the Act and is a body exclusively exercising
judicial functions, notwithstanding its placement in the executive,
rather than the judicial branch.' 2 The statute provides that this
Commission shall be composed of three members,' 3 each of whom is
appointed by the President for a six year term. '4 The Chairman of the
Commission is empowered to appoint Review Commission Judges, who
hold terms of career tenure,' 5 and who hear all cases entered in the
Commission,' 6 rendering the final decision in better than 90 percent of
them.
In the statute, the Review Commission Judges are called "hearing
examiners,'" 7 a designation perhaps more appropriate for federal
regulatory agencies than for a commission whose sole function is to
adjudicate adversary proceedings.' 8 As the proper title for persons
engaged in this function is "judge," the Commission, in its first year of
existence, exercised its authority' 9 to make this title official. 2 0 The
Commission presently has 42 judges who travel throughout the country
in order to conduct all hearings in the community where the alleged
violation took place. 2 ,
The Act imposes numerous requirements upon management, which
are set forth in just two clauses, covering only seven lines of print in §
5(a) of the Act:

Each employer(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees;
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health
standards promUlgated under this Act. 2 2
Few employers are excluded from its coverage. 2 3
Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary of Labor has already promulgated
12. Id. § 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 661(a).
13. [d.
14. Id. § 12(b), 29 U.S.C. § 661(b).
15. Id. § 12(e), 29 U.S.C. § 661(d).
16. [d. § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i).
17. [d. §§ 12(e), (j), (k), 29 U.S.C. §§ 661(d), (i), (j).
18. Id. § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 5105(c) (1970).
20. 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972). See also OSHRC Release No. 15 (Mar. 23, 1972).
21. OSHA § 12(d), 29 U.S.C. § 661(c) (1970). Such is the case if adequate courtroom facilities
are available there; but if not, then the nearest available facility appropriate for the
conduct of a hearing is used.
22. OSHA § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970).
23. The only workers not covered by OSHA are those whose jobs are covered by other federal
legislation such as that regulating coal mining: Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30
U.S.C. § 801 (1970); and atomic energy: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021
(1970).
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numerous occupational safety and health standards, and many more
will undoubtedly be forthcoming.2 4
If one of OSHA's compliance officers discloses what is believed to be
a violation of the Act, the employer will, within a reasonable time,
receive two documents from the Labor Department: (1) a citation
describing the nature of the violation by referring to the particular
"provision of the Act, standard, rule, regulation or order violated and
fixing a reasonable time for the abatement of the violation ... "2 5 ; and
(2) a notification of the proposed monetary penalty, which will be
stated as a sum certain. 2 6
Upon receipt of these two documents, the employer has two
alternatives: (1) correct the violation and pay the penalty as proposed;
or (2) contest the issuance of the citation, the amount of the proposed
penalty, or both. If the employer should decide to contest the citation
and proposed penalty, he must take affirmative action by notifying the
Secretary within 15 working days.27 Should the employer fail to act
within that time "the citation and the assessment, as proposed, shall be
deemed a final order ... and not subject to review by any court or
agency,,,28 (which has, in fact, happened in 95 percent of the more
than 40,000 enforcement actions initiated to date under this Act).
However, when an employer takes affirmative action within 15
working days to dispute the Labor Department's action against him, he
thereby initiates a contest to the enforcement action. Since there has
been no hearing (merely an allegation of a violation coupled with a
proposed penalty), the employer's action putting them in dispute is
called, for the purposes of this Act, a Notice of Contest.
As a statutory matter, the Notice of Contest can merely be a letter
from the employer to the Secretary of Labor stating, "I contest the
action you have initiated against me.,,2 9 However, procedurally, there
is a little more to it. The employer's letter must be sent to the Area
Director of the Labor Department's Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA),30 whose name and address will be listed on
both the citation and the proposed penalty, the latter informing the
employer of exactly what he must do to contest. Then, the employer
must notify his own employees that he is contesting the Labor
Department's action. This has been imposed pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure of the Occupational Safety and Health Review 3 1 Commission in order to effectuate the last sentence of § 10(c) of the Act:

24. OSHA § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970).
25. [d. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
26. [d. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a).
27. [d.

28.
29.
30.
31.

[d.
[d. § lO(e), 29 U.S.C. § 659(e).
29 C.F.R. § 1903, 17(a) (1972).
OSHA § 12(g), 29 U.S.C. § 661(f) (1970).
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"The rules of procedure prescribed by the Commission shall
provide affected employees or representatives of affected
employees an opportunity to participate as parties to hearings
under this subsection."3 2
Once the OSHA Area Director receives the employer's Notice of
Contest, he will mail it directly to the Executive Secretary of the
Review Commission together with a copy of all citations and penalty
proposals which the employer is contesting. 3 3 A docket number is then
assigned to the case, and the parties are notified.
Henceforth, the procedure follows the traditional system for the
hearing of a nonjury civil case: the Commission notifies all parties of
the docketing of the case, the Secretary of Labor must file a formal
Complaint within 20 d ays34 of his receipt of the Notice of Contest,
and the employer's Answer is due within 15 days35 after receipt
thereof. After completion of the pleadings, the case is heard as soon as
a judge becomes available, unless a pre-hearing conference is decided
upon. 36
'
Hearings are conducted in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 7 The burden
of proof is on the Secretary of Labor, 3 8 and there is no presumption of
regularity in favor of either the Labor Department's citation or its
penalty proposal.
When the judge decides a case, there is no statutory right to review
by the Commission. His decision will automatically become a final
order 30 days after it is filed, unless, within such period, anyone of the
three members exercises his right of discretionary review. 3 9 However,
since the Act provides that all final orders of the Commission may be
appealed to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals,4 0 it does
not matter whether the final order is based on the decision of the
Review Commission Judge or the action of the members of the
Commission themselves after the exercise of their review rights.
,
Current figures indicate that the Commission has only exercised its
discretionary right of review in approximately ten percent of the
decisions filed with it by the judges. But when this does occur, the
32. [d. § 1O(c), 29 V.S.C. § 659(c).
33. [d.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(a)(1) (1972). The Rules of Procedure of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission became effective with their publication in the Federal
Register on September 28, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 20,237. They are codified in volume 29 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.1-.110 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rule].
(In this article the codification prefix "2200" which precedes each rule number as it is
published in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations has been omitted.)
35. Rule 33(b)(l).
36. Rule 51.
37, OSHA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
38. [d.; Rule 73(a).
39. OSHA § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 66l(i) (1970).
40. [d. § l1(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a).
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parties are notified and given the opportunity to submit briefs and
exceptions. Oral arguments have never been scheduled in any
proceeding, the Commission basing its decision on the briefs and the
record made before the Review Commission Judge. Although anyone
of the three members can exercise his statutory right of discretionary
review, a majority of the members is needed to decide a case.
Some principles of law are already beginning to emerge from the first
500 decisions rendered by the Review Commission. 4 1 These include:
the definition of what constitutes a "recognized hazard" under the
General Duty Clause of the Act; the responsibility of employers for
unsafe acts of their employees; the establishment of what constitutes a
"reasonable time" between an inspection and the issuance of a citation;
the appropriateness of penalties; and the extent to which stipUlations
(particularly with regard to penalties) should be accepted by the
Commission.
"RECOGNIZED HAZARD" AND THE GENERAL
DUTY CLAUSE
The General Duty Clause, § 5(a)(1), reads as follows:
Each employer(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees;4 2
The General Duty Clause, contained above, was the result of
legislative compromise, having both ardent supporters and vigorous
opponents. The clause was inserted because there was general
agreement among the bill's proponents that not every job safety and
health situation could be covered by a specific standard. It was assumed
that the clause would be invoked sparingly4 3 in enforcement
procedures, and that the Secretary would rely to the greatest extent
possible on specific standards. While that, for the most part, has proven
to be the case, there still have been a relatively small number of
employers whom the Secretary has charged with violations of the
General Duty Clause.
41. A caveat is in order at this point. There are some who take the position that the opinions of
its judges, which are allowed to become final by the failure of the Commission to exercise
its 30 day option to certify a case for review, have no precedential value on the grounds
that when the Commission permits the judge's order and decision to become final, it
adopts the order only because it favors the result. The statute, however, specifies that
decisions which become final in this way become the final order of the Commission.
OSHA § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970).
42. OSHA § 5(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970).
43. 116 CONGo REC. 42,206 (1970).
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Obviously, the problem of the General Duty Clause arises from the
vagueness of "recognized hazards." Congressman Steiger, speaking of
the bill that emerged from the House-Senate conference said that:
"Such hazards are the type that can be readily detected on the basis of
the basic human senses. Hazards which require technical or testing
devices to detect . . . are not intended to be within the scope of the
general duty requirement."4 4
Representative Daniels of New Jersey maintained that:
A recognized hazard is a condition that is known to be
hazardous, and is known not necessarily by each and every
individual employer but is known taking into account the
standard of knowledge in the industry. In other words, whether
or not a hazard is 'recognized' is a matter for objective
determination; it does not depend on whether the particular
employer is aware of it.4 5
A reasonable interpretation would seem that, to establish a violation
of this clause, the evidence of record must show that the condition
cited was readily determined by unaided human senses, and that the
condition is recognized as a hazard likely to cause death or serious
physical injury by reasonable and prudent people, not merely by safety
experts or OSHA inspectors.
In most of the few cases decided under this clause, there was
evidence that the employer either admitted that he knew his working
conditions constituted a recognized hazard, or that fact had been
affirmatively brought to his attention in some manner prior to the time
he was charged. In two instances where it was my opinion that this was
not the case, I found it necessary to dissent from the majority opinion
which found the employer in violation.
In Secretary ot Labor v. Hidden Valley Corporation ot Virginia, 4 6 it
was found that the employer, while in the process of digging trenches
for a sewer pipe, allowed empioyees to work in a trench ten feet deep
which had not been shored or sloped. The trench collapsed, killing two
persons, which precipitated a citation of Hidden Valley for violating the
General Duty Clause.
The judge made 15 findings of fact relative to the trench collapse,
but in none of them did he find that the condition of the trench
constituted a recognized hazard. He found that working in such a
trench coqstituted a "hazard" and that such a trench "is considered
unsafe,,,47 yet, he ruled (and a majority of the Commission agreed)
that the employer had violated the General Duty Clause.
44. [d.
45. [d. at 38,377.
46. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission [hereinafter cited as OSHRC) Dock.
No. 11, 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDE [hereinafter cited as 2 CCH EMPL.
S. & H.G.) ~ 15,035 (Feb. 8, 1972).
47. Judge's Report at 4.
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I dissented, feeling that if merely establishing that a certain condition
constitutes a "hazard" is sufficient to sustain a violation of § 5(a)(1) of
the Act, there would be no need for the Labor Department ever to cite
an employer under any other provision. It appeared that the purpose of
the Congress had been ignored, and that the Commission's majority had
converted a precisely-worded legislative enactment into a sweeping
general requirement which endangered the usefulness of the detailed
standards promulgated by the Secretary.4 8
Again, in Secretary of Labor v. National Realty and Construction
CO.,49 it did not appear to me that the facts established that the
violation with which the employer was charged constituted a recognized hazard. The facts there indicate that in September of 1971,
one of National Realty's foremen was riding on the "running-board" of
a front-end loader at a construction site. As the loader descended a dirt
ramp, the engine stalled; the loader continued down the ramp,
overturned, and fatally injured the foreman. Shortly thereafter, the
Secretary of Labor cited National Realty for a violation of the General
Duty Clause. 5o The Review Commission Judge accepted the compliance officer's statement that "the general safety requirements of the
Corps of Engineers prohibited riding on equipment .... "51 as
sufficient evidence to find that such an act constituted a recognized
hazard likely to result in serious injury or death, a finding with which
the majority again agreed.
To my mind, this was clearly contrary to the intention of Congress.
This decision said, in essence, that if general safety requirements of
some standard-establishing authority prohibit an act, then that act
should be assumed to be a recognized hazard. Obviously, as there are
many acts prohibited by the general requirements of the Corps of
Engineers in the interests of employee safety, by the standards
promUlgated by the Secretary of Labor, and by those of many other
; authorities, it would be clearly unreasonable to say that every act
prohibited in the interests of safety constitutes a recognized hazard
"causing or likely to cause death or serious physical injury."s 2

EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYEE ACTS
AND OMISSIONS
The Act exhorts employees to "comply with Occupational Safety
and Health standards,"s 3 but it places the real burden of providing a
48. OSHRC Dock. No. 11, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. '\I 15,035, at 20,048-49.
49. OSHRC Dock. No. 85, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. '\115,188 (Sept. 6, 1972).
50.Id.
51. Id. at 20,270.
52. OSHA § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970).
53. Id. § 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 654(b).
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safe and healthful workplace on the employer. s 4 Since there are no
enforcement procedures or penalties for unsafe acts by employees, only
the employer faces the punitive teeth of the Act. s 5 Further, because
the Act does not restrict violations to unsafe acts authorized or
permitted by the employer, he can also be found in violation if he knew
or could have known "with the exercise of reasonable diligence"S 6 of
an unsafe practice.
While the Act attempts to make it clear to employers that they have
final responsibility for compliance, it would be unreasonable to assume
that the employer is necessarily in violation of the Act whenever one of
his employees fails to comply with a standard. For example, in
Secretary of Labor v. Standard Glass Co.,S 7 the judge ruled that the
employer was not in violation for an isolated instance in which two of
its employees failed to wear protective headgear in a "hard hat" area.
On review, the Commission affirmed, stating:
An employer cannot in all circumstances be held to the strict
standard of being an absolute guarantor or insurer that his
employees will observe all of the Secretary's standards at all
times. An isolated brief violation of a standard by an employee
which is unknown to the employer and is contrary to both the
employer's instructions and a company work rule which the
employer has uniformly enforced does not necessarily constitute a violation of section 5(a)(2) of the Act by the
employer.s S
As was noted in National Realty,S 9 the Commission found that the
isolated act of the foreman in riding on the loader violated a company
rule that had been the responsibility of the employer to enforce. 6 0
However, in view of the firm's history of not allowing anyone to ride
on such equipment, there seemed to me no way in which the employer,
in exercising "reasonable diligence," could have known about the act.
Accordingly, I felt that there was no way ~he employer could have been
aware of the unsafe act and taken measures to prevent it, short of
assigning a supervisor to follow the foreman around during his working
hours. 61
Indeed, in Secretary of Labor v. Hansen Bra thers Logging Co., 62 the
Commission adopted a rationale similar to that which I had espoused in
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a).
Id. § 17,29 U.S.C. § 666.
Id. § 17(k), 29 U.S.C. § 666(j).
OSHRC Dock. No. 259, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G.,-r 15,146 (June 26,1972).
58. Id. at 20,219.
59. OSHRC Dock. No. 85, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ,-r 15,188 (Sept. 6, 1972).
60.Id.
61. Id. at 20,268-71 (dissent).
,
62. OSHRC Dock. No. 141, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ,-r 15,258 (Oct. 13, 1972). Respondent
operated a small logging business employing about five people. In the operation of the
business, it was necessary to load logs onto trucks with a crane-like log-loading machine
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National Realty. 6 3 There, the Commission, in overruling the Review
Commission Judge, stated:
The record shows that respondent's owner gave specific oral
instructions to its employees to stay clear of the loading area
while the equipment was in motion. The hazard was obvious.
Respondent's employees were repeatedly reminded of the
danger involved and were told to stay out unless they were
instructed to approach the area after the machinery had been
stopped. There is nothing in the record to show that
respondent's owner knew or reasonably should have known that
the deceased employee would disobey these instructions. In the
presence of these conditions, and because of the nature of the
operation, to require respondent to provide one-on-one supervision of its employees would place respondent under the
unreasonably burdensome duty of having to establish the
whereabouts of each of its employees prior to every operation
of its equipment. 6 4
However, the Commission has barely begun to move into this
extremely difficult area. We are just beginning to ask the questions:
answers, if there are any, will come only after an arduous struggle with
Gordian complexities. Quaere: To what extent is the employer
responsible for the apparently negligent acts of his employees? Can the
employer's duty of care be reduced or alleviated by providing his
employees with detailed, mandatory safety instructions? Can the
employer's responsibility be limited at all, or is he to be responsible for
the unsafe acts and omissions of his employees under all but the most
extraordinary of circumstances? Can rigid guidelines be established to
define employer responsibility, or must an ad hoc determination be
made? As the Commission rules on cases involving these questions, it is
hoped that at least rudimentary guidelines will be established.
REASONABLE TIME BETWEEN INSPECTION AND
ISSUANCE OF CITATION
The Act is vague with regard to the period of time the Secretary of
Labor has to issue his citation after a job safety and health inspection.
The Act requires merely that the Secretary "shall with reasonable
promptness issue a citation to the employer,,,6 5 and may not issue one
that would rotate through an arc of approximately 180 degrees during the loading
operation. An employee, apparently having been struck by part of the machine, was killed.
The recmd showed that the respondent had repeatedly warned his employees to stand
clear of the area while the machine was in operation because of the obvious hazard it
presented.
63. OSHRC Doc. No. 85, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. 1/ 15,188, at 20.268-71 (Sept. 6, 1972)
(dissent).
64. Secretary of Labor v. Hansen Brothers Logging Co., OSHRC Dock. No. 141, 2 CCH EMPL.
S. & H.G. 1/15,258, at 20,341 (Oct. 13, 1972).
65. OSHA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970).
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subsequent to the passage of six months following the alleged
violation. 66 The Secretary ha,s, on at least one occasion, taken almost
80 days of "reasonable" time between the inspection and the issuance
of a citation,67 but that extent of delay was not intended by Congress.
The "Statement of the Managers of Part of the House," commenting on
the conference committee from which the Act emerged, addresses this
point:
The Senate bill provided that if, upon inspection or
investigation, the Secretary or his authorized representative
"determines" that an employer has violated mandatory requirements under the act, he shall "forthwith" issue a citation .. The
House amendment provided that if on the basis of an inspection
or investigation the Secretary "believes" that an employer has
violated such requirements, he shall issue a citation to the
employer. The conference report provides that if the Secretary
"believes" that an employer violated such requirements he shall
issue the citation with "reasonable promptness." In the absence
of exceptional circumstances any delay is not expected to
exceed 72 hours from the time the violation is detected by the
inspector.6 8
The Commission has not, as yet, issued any decision regarding
_",reasonable time," but the manifestly clear intent of Congress is for the
Commission to hold the Secretary of Labor to the 72 hour limit in
routine cases. Thus, failure of the Secretary to issue a citation within 72
hours of an inspection should ordinarily be a strong argument for
dismissal of any citation resulting therefrom.

APPROPRIATENESS OF PENALTIES
The area in which the Commission has established the firmest
guidelines is that of penalties. At the outset, a point should be made
that has proven very difficult to establish: the Labor Department
merely proposes penalties,69 while the power to assess penalties rests
with the Review Commission. Only where an employer fails to file
timely Notice of Contest 7 0 does the OSHA penalty proposal (no matter
how unjust) become final, as the Commission and all other courts and
66. [d. § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 658(c).
67. In a case still in review, Secretary of Labor v. Plastering, Inc., OSHRC Dock. No. 1037,
rev'd ordered, Oct. 31, 1972, the inspection took place on March 21, 1972; and no citation
was issued until June 6, 1972. There are a number of other cases where the lag between
inspection and citation is one of the issues to be decided in which shorter, but still
unreasonably long, delays occurred.
68. 160 CONGo REC. 42,200 (1970).
69. OSHA § lO(b), 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1970).
70. [d.
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agencies 7 I are thereby excluded from the process. However, when a
contest is filed, the Secretary's penalty proposal should be accorded no
more weight than is given his evidence and argument on the alleged
violation. If the Department of Labor establishes to the satisfaction of
the Review Commission Judge that the employer has indeed violated
the Act, the next question should not be whether the Secretary's
penalty proposal is appropriate, but rather, what penalty, if any, is
appropriate for the infraction.
During its first year and a half, there were a number of cases in which
the Commission differed with OSHA on penalties. The first of these
cases arose out of the OSHA Compliance Operations Manual, 7 2 which
ptovided a formula to guide its people in arriving at an amount to be
proposed as a penalty.73 While § 17 (j) of the Act provided that, in
assessing civil penalties, the Commission shall give "due consideration
to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the
business ... , the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the
employer, and the history of previous violations,"7 4 the formula called
for calculations which began with the maximum permissible penalty,
then applied varying percentage discounts for only three of the four
penalty assessment criteria set forth above: 75 20 percent for the
employer's history of previous violations, ten percent for the size of the
employer's business, and 20 percent for his "good faith."
This formula was challenged in Secretary of Labor v. Nacirema
Operating CO.,7 6 where the Commission observed that, although
Congress had provided for a range of penalties from a minimum of one
cent to a maximum of $1000,77 this formula always resulted in the
administration of a minimum fine of $500. The Commission
accordingly rejected the formula, in thatl it clearly presented both the
danger of an excessive and burdensome penalty for a violation of
minimum gravity, as well as the possibility (for different reasons) of a
nearly insignificant penalty for a violation of maximum gravity.
Further, it was apparent that the Secretary had not only superimposed
arbitrary percentage factors, but had given no consideration whatsoever
to the gravity of the violation. Without more, the Commission could
not, in good conscience, accept a proposed penalty which had not
been based upon "due consideration" of the statutory criteria.
As the Commission's review in Nacirema was limited to the facts in
that particular case, the Commission could not make a rule requiring
the Secretary to abandon forever the formula. Whereas the Secretary
71. [d.
72. See DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL (rev. 1971).
73. [d. at xl-2 to x1-4.
74. OSHA § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970).

75. [d.
76. OSHRC Dock. No.4, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,032 (Feb. 7, 1972).
77. OSHA § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
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must accept the Commission's ruling in each individual case. he is not
compelled by law to apply that ruling to subsequent cases. This
situation clearly illustrates that the Review Commission is not a
substantive rule-making body, but one exercising a judicial function,
irrespective of where it is placed in the federal government.
Following Nacirema, the Commission reviewed Hidden ValleY,7 S in
which OSHA proposed a penalty of $600 for a serious violation of the
General Duty Clause 7•9 that was affirmed by the Commission's judge as
"not unreasonable." The Commission pointed out that considerations
involved in one or more of the four stafutory criteriaS0 may well
override all of the others in relation to the assessment of a penalty. In
this case, it found that one of them, "[ t] he gravity, of the violation
charged,"S 1 was, as the decision termed it, "of signal importance."s 2
On that basis, the proposed penalty was found to be inadequate, and
the maximum of $1000 was imposed.
After Hidden Valley, the Commission decided a number of cases in
which the Secretary had issued citations for minor violations of safety
and sanitation standards in which the proposed penalties were so small
(some less than a parking ticket) that they clearly lacked deterrent
effect. In Secretary of Labor u. J. E. Chilton Millwork and Lumber
Co., S 3 for example, the Commission served notice that it believed that
"[r] elatively minor monetary penalties do little to effectuate [the
objectives of the Act]. Web therefore, will look carefully at cases
involving such proposed penalties."s 4 Not only does this sort of minor
penalty do little toward achievement of a safe and healthful place of
employment for all workers, but it may have exactly the opposite
effect. As was stated in Secretary of Labor v. General Meat Co.: S 5
The Commission believes that the purposes and policies of the
Act are better served by the encouragement of immediate
abatement through other means than the proposal of small
monetary penalties which do little to achieve voluntary
compliance .... It has been the Commission's experience that
the proposal of small penalties in these circumstances is often
interpreted by employers as harassment. This understandable
reaction of employers frequently results in the filing of a
contest with its consequent tolling of the abatement period.
Such contests tend to interfere with the swift accomplishment
of the goals of the Act. S 6
OSHRC Dock. No. 11,2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,035 (Feb. 8, 1972).
OSHA § 5(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1970).
[d. § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i).
Id.
OSHRC Dock. No.1:, 2CCH EMPL. S & HG ~ 15,035, at 20,048 (Feb. 8, 1972).
OSHRC Dock. No. 123, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,069 (May 15, 1972).
84. [d. at 20,12l.
85. OSHRC Dock. No. 250, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,098 (.June 20, 1972).
86. Id. at 20,156.
78.
79.
80.
I'll.
82.
83.
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While there is nothing at all wrong with a penalty proposal of zero
dollars and zero cents where the purposes of the Act are achieved by
full abatement, 8 7 this should not be taken to mean that the
Commission will vacate all small penalty proposals for minor violations
as a matter of course. Thus, in the recent case of Secretary of Labor v.
Hydroswift Corp.,8 8 the Review Commission endorsed the action of
one of its judges in assessing small penalties for minor violations. The
Commission's decision stated:
We hold that the assessment of small monetary penalties for
non-serious violations having the level of gravity of the
violations found in this case (unguarded, opensided floors, two
fire hazard violations, nine instances of failure to ground power
tools) effectuates the purpose of this Act. Penalties of this
caliber serve to remind all employers that their primary
responsibility under the Act is adherence to its protective
mechanisms. Failure to impose penalties relating to violations
with higher levels of gravity serves only to restrain the Act's
effective operation and hinder its function to reduce the
hazards of the workplace for all employees .
. . . We stress that this caution in the face of seemingly minor
violations reflects a strong intent on our part to see that
violations of this type are not encouraged by the failure to
assess penalties when penalties are proper under the circumstances. 89
-Although the Commission has established a numoer of guidelines in
its early concentration on the area of the appropriateness of penalties,
further refinement and clarification is still in order. The frequency of
Commission decisions regarding penalties, however, will doubtless
diminish as the members turn to other areas where vague outlines of
law need the sharp focus of precedent.

STIPULATIONS AND PRE-HEARING SETTLEMENTS
The Act grants the Secretary the opportunity to compromise, settle,
and mitigate. 9o Section 10(c) requires that hearings of the Commission
be conducted in accordance with 5 U .S.C. § 554, which provides, inter
alia, for a hearing "to the extent that the parties are unable so to
87. This view is supported by Senator Williams of New Jersey, a co-author of the Act. In the
course of responding to employer criticism of citations on the first inspection, he told the
Senate on September 15, 1972: "This, of course, does not mean that first-instance
penalties should be imposed in every case, nor does the Act require that penalties be
assessed-at any time-for non serious violations." 118 CONGo REC. 15,047 (daily ed. Sept.
15; 1972).
88. OSHRC Dock. No. 591, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. 11 15,275 (Oct. 27, 1972).
89. [d. at 20,368.
90. OSHA § 6(e), 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1970).
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determine a controversy by consent .... "9 1 It would seem that since
the Secretary's good faith in enforcing the Act is unquestioned, the
Commission should, in the absence of fraud, accept settlements reached
by the Secretary and the employer without involving itself with issues
not raised by the stipulation. This type of sua sponte involvement
occurred in Secretary of Labor v. American Home Products (Ekco
Housewares CO.),9 2 where the employer entered into a stipulation in
which it agreed to withdraw Notice of Contest and pay the assessment
as proposed, without admitting the alleged violations. The Review
Commission Judge accepted the settlement, however, on further review,
the majority of the Commission determined that the record transmitted
by the judge indicated that the violation for which the respondent was
cited was possibly of greater gravity than the judge had determined. 9 3
Accordingly, the Commission issued an order to show cause, in which
they invited the parties to adduce additional evidence bearing on the
appropriateness of the proposed penalty.
I disagreed with the majority on the theory that when the employer
does not contest the amount of the proposed penalty, the Commission
should not interfere. Although § 17(j) of the Act gives to the
Commission the authority to "assess all civil penalties,"94 I reasoned
that that section is not in conflict with the Act's encouragement to
achieve settlement whenever possible. As I stated in the dissent:
The sure and speedy concessions, the abatement of the
hazard and the saving of the Commission's and the Secretary's
resources which a settlement achieves outweigh, in my mind,
the possibility that an employer may be made to smart more
appropriately by a heavier or more propitious penalty.
N or should the Commission fret about "whether the stipulated disposition is consistent with the provisions of the Act and
accords with the public interest." In my opinion, the Commission does not have sole or even primary responsibility in this
area. The Secretary of Labor's responsibilities include the
determination of employer compliance with the Act (Sec. 9(a»
and he also has both inherent authority, as well as implicit
authority within the Act itself, to compromise, mitigate and
settle actions initiated by him (see, for example, Sec. 6(e». Of
course, he may also conduct a subsequent inspection at any
time and initiate such action as he deems then to be warranted.
In view of the Secretary's enormous responsibility and
authority for occupational safety and health, I find his assent to
the stipulated settlement of this case most persuasive.9 5
.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(2) (1970).
OSHRC Dock. No.3, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,025 (Nov. 16, 1971).
[d. at 20,021-22.
OSHA § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970).
OSHRC Dock. No.3, 2 CCH EMPL. S. & H.G. ~ 15,025, at 20,022 (Feb. 16, 1971).
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After considering the responses to the order to show cause, the
Commission decided to permit the employer to withdraw without
change in the penalty previously agreed upon by the parties.

CONCLUSION
From its nascence, the Occupational Safety and Health Act has had
critics assailing it for what they see as its expansive imprecision. Despite
the differing opinions of its members, the Review Commission has and
will continue to strive to resolve and clarify those areas where
ambiguities exist in the Act. It is hoped that this article's discussion of
the Act's legislative history and the Commission's interpretations of it
will serve to enlighten those unacquainted ,vith its provisions and to
familiarize the employer with its requirements and consequences. While
the scope of this article does not encompass all areas and problems
associated with the Act, it does provide an occasional glimpse through
the obfuscation with which the Act has been surrounded by some of its
detractors.

